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Abstract
NIRP has quickly become a consensus policy within the economics establishment. This
paper argues that consensus is dangerously wrong, resting on flawed theory and flawed
policy assessment. Regarding theory, NIRP draws on fallacious pre-Keynesian classical
economic logic that asserts there is a natural rate of interest which can ensure full
employment. That pre-Keynesian logic has been augmented by ZLB economics which
claims the natural rate may be negative in times of severe demand shortage, so that policy
must deliver it since the market cannot. In contrast, Keynes argued investment could
become saturated so lower interest rates cannot increase aggregate demand (AD) and no
natural interest rate exists. Regarding policy assessment, NIRP turns a blind eye to the
possibility that negative interest rates may reduce AD, cause financial fragility, create a
macroeconomics of whiplash owing to contradictions between policy today and
tomorrow, promote currency wars that undermine the international economy, and foster a
political economy that spawns toxic politics. Worst of all, NIRP maintains and
encourages the flawed model of growth, based on debt and asset price inflation, which
has already done such harm.
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JEL references: E00, E10, E12, E44, E52
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1. Introduction: the Great Stagnation and the emergence of NIRP
In the wake of the 2009 Great Recession and ensuing Great Stagnation, many central
banks embraced the idea of setting negative interest rates by charging commercial banks
for reserves placed on deposit with the central bank. The list of central banks that adopted
this policy includes the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Swiss National
Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the Danish Central Bank.
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The embrace of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has been supported by most
mainstream macroeconomists and NIRP has now become part of consensus mainstream
macroeconomic policy. In a December 2015 interview, former Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke said the Federal Reserve was likely to add negative interest rates as a
policy tool. In March 2016 Bernanke followed that up with an extended Brookings
Institution blog on the tools central banks have to fight slow growth, beginning with
negative interest rates. In February 2016 testimony before the US House of
Representatives, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen stated negatives were still on
the policy table. And in April 2016 the IMF jumped on to the negative interest rate
bandwagon when Managing Director Lagarde declared they are a net positive to the
global economy, a position that was strongly echoed by IMF financial counsellor Jose
Vinals in a briefing at the IMF 2016 spring meetings and in an IMF blog posting (Vinals
et al. 2016).
This paper explores the new NIRP consensus and argues it is profoundly wrong.
The new consensus embodies both flawed theory and flawed policy. At the theoretical
level, it mistakenly believes in the classical natural rate of interest (NRI) doctrine, which
claims there exists a real interest rate that delivers full employment. That theoretical
belief has been supplemented by zero lower bound (ZLB) economics (Eggertsson and
Krugman, 2012), which adds the twist that the NRI may be negative and out of reach of
market forces. That justifies the recommendation that central banks set negative rates via
NIRP.
At the policy level, the new consensus embodies two failures. First, negative
interest rates may be counter-productive regarding their impact on aggregate demand

2

(AD). Second, NIRP continues and actively encourages the debt-led asset price inflation
model of economic growth that has caused so much trouble. Not only will NIRP not
solve the problems posed by stagnation, it risks aggravating them.
2. The “modern” theory behind NIRP: the NRI and the ZLB
NIRP represents both a continuation and extension of the theoretical thinking that has
shaped macroeconomic policy over the past thirty-five years. The continuation reflects
the focus on interest rates as the critical tool for stabilizing the economy and ensuring full
employment. The extension reflects the embrace of negative interest rates, which policy
must deliver in times of low inflation with demand shortage because the market cannot
do so owing to the zero lower bound (ZLB) to nominal interest rates.
On the surface, NIRP appears revolutionary. However, its analytical justification
rests on pre-Keynesian macroeconomic thinking that regained ascendancy in the 1970s.2
That thinking was celebrated in the notion of the “Great Moderation” (1980 – 2007)
which prevailed prior to the financial crisis of 2008. The claim was macroeconomic
performance, as measured by inflation and the frequency and depth of recessions, greatly
improved after 1980 owing to improvements in the conduct of monetary policy.
(2.a) Stage 1: Revival of the NRI.
According to Great Moderation believers, the improvement rested on policy
developments informed by improved theory. First, at the theoretical level, there was a
restoration of pre-Keynesian classical macroeconomic ideas which described the
economy as stable and self-adjusting relatively quickly back to full employment in
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Milton Friedman was critical here. His famous 1967 American Economic Association presidential
address (Friedman, 1968) is principally remembered for introducing the concept of the natural rate of
unemployment. However, it also revived the Wicksellian concept of the natural rate of interest, and that
may even have been its major objective.
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response to economic disturbances. According to classical macroeconomics, the real
interest rate is the critical macroeconomic price that clears the loanable funds market,
ensuring full employment saving equals full employment investment. Second, at the
policy level there was a shift to low inflation targeting conducted via independent central
banks using clear credible interest rate rules. Policy identified an inflation target, and then
set a nominal interest rate consistent with the inflation target and the full employment
loanable funds real interest rate (i.e. the NRI).
Anytime the economy got into trouble, monetary policy engineered a lower
nominal interest rate, which lowered the real interest rate given an unchanged inflation
target. That stimulated investment and lowered saving. Moreover, to the extent that lower
interest rates increased asset prices, that was also beneficial since higher asset prices
encourage consumption which lowers saving, and they also encourage investment.
This policy response was adopted in the recessions of 1991-2 and 2001-2. It also
constituted the immediate response to the financial crisis of 2007-8, the belief and hope
being that lower rates would quickly reflate asset prices and stimulate demand.
(2.b) Stage 2: the ZLB
NIRP began to enter the picture when the policy interest rate was pushed to zero – hitting
the so-called zero lower bound (ZLB). Initially, hitting the ZLB prompted central banks
to engage in quantitative easing (QE), which involves purchasing longer-dated bonds.3
When that failed to adequately stimulate the economy, NIRP became the next policy of
choice based on simple extrapolative logic: if lower interest rates stimulate AD, then
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QE has many similar downsides to those discussed in this paper regarding NIRP, particularly as concerns
promotion of asset price bubbles and adverse political economy effects (Palley, 2011). However, QE is a
less radical policy, which is why it may still be positive on balance.
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lowering rates into negative territory should do the same.
The justification for NIRP has been significantly assisted by the claim that the
ZLB explains the stagnation that set in after the Great Recession of 2007-09 (Eggertsson
and Krugman, 2012). The ZLB hypothesis of stagnation was originated by Paul Krugman
(1998) to explain Japan’s stagnation after the collapse of its asset price bubble in 1991.
Now, the story has been modified in an attempt to explain stagnation in the US.
The story is that after the financial crisis, US households decided to repair their
balance sheets by deleveraging and paying down debt. That caused an increase in the full
employment supply of saving (loanable funds), necessitating a fall in the real interest rate
to equilibrate the loanable funds market. However, that was blocked off by the ZLB. The
resulting excess supply in the loanable funds market then compelled a contraction of
employment and output, to balance the goods market.
The ZLB theory of stagnation is illustrated in Figure 1.4 The left-hand panel
shows loanable funds market in which saving and investment are equilibrated via
adjustment of the interest rate. The economy is initially at full employment equilibrium
with an interest rate of r0, which constitutes the “natural rate of interest” (NRI) as
determined by initial economic conditions.5 Given an exogenous inflation rate (π), the
nominal interest rate is i0 = r0 + π.
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This section draws from Palley (2016b) who also provides an empirical critique of ZLB based
explanations of stagnation. The bottom line is that attempts to apply ZLB narratives do not fit the data.
5
Note, the NRI is not exogenously fixed. Instead, it depends on current conditions and their impact on the
demand for and supply of loanable funds.
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Figure 1. The ZLB story of stagnation.
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The ZLB explanation of the stagnation holds that the equilibrium was disturbed
by a deleveraging shock that increased saving and shifted the saving function (i.e. the
supply of loanable funds) to the right, as shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 1.
Maintaining balance between full employment saving and full employment investment
required a negative real interest rate of r1, but that was blocked of by the ZLB.
The middle panel shows the goods market in which aggregate demand (AD0)
initially equals full employment aggregate supply (y*) at the real interest rate of r0. The
deleveraging shock increases saving and shifts the AD function down (AD1), requiring a
negative real NRI of r1 to clear the goods market. That is blocked off by the ZLB, leaving
the economy with demand shortage and excess supply.6 The excess supply of saving and
output in turn trigger a contraction of output, which is illustrated in the middle panel by a
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With the nominal interest rate at zero (i = 0), the real interest rate is equal to the negative of the inflation
rate, but that is still not low enough to generate sufficient AD to support full employment.
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shift along the new AD schedule. Output and income contract until the level of output is
equal to the level of AD, given the new real interest rate (r2 = - π).
The right hand panel shows the parallel adjustment process in loanable funds
market adjustment. The fall in output from y* to y2 reduces income, causing the saving
function to shift left (S2) and saving to fall. It also causes the investment function to shift
left (I2) and investment to fall. The contraction of output continues until saving and
investment are brought back into balance at the real interest rate of r2.
(2.c) Assessing the ZLB story
There are several features to note about the ZLB story. First, the ZLB is the cause of
unemployment and stagnation as it prevents the nominal interest rate from falling,
thereby blocking the real interest rate from falling to the NRI.
Second, the underlying economic belief is that a lower real interest rate can
always solve the problem of aggregate demand shortage. It is assumed to do so by
increasing investment demand and reducing saving.
Third, the core economic theory behind the ZLB story derives from preKeynesian classical macroeconomics. At the center of classical macroeconomics is the
loanable funds theory of interest rates, according to which saving and investment are
coordinated via adjustment of the real interest rate, thereby delivering full employment.
The real interest rate (i.e. the loanable funds rate) is the critical mechanism, and it adjusts
to ensure full employment saving equals full employment investment demand – or
equivalently, that aggregate demand equals full employment aggregate supply. In New
Keynesian models, this classical interest rate adjustment mechanism is managed by the
central bank via its nominal interest policy. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate
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aiming to target an inflation rate consistent with its belief regarding the NRI required for
clearing the loanable funds market.7
Fourth, though the core theory derives from classical macroeconomics, the
economy can appear Keynesian because output adjusts when the real interest rate cannot.
In normal times, the real interest rate adjusts to balance full employment saving and full
employment investment to ensure AD equals full employment aggregate supply (AS).
However, when the real interest rate cannot adjust (as at the ZLB), output does the
adjusting to align AS with AD. That gives the economy its Keynesian look.
Fifth, there are two policy solutions to the problem as diagnosed by ZLB
economics. Solution number one is for the monetary authority to drive up inflation
expectations. Since the real interest rate is equal to the nominal interest rate (which is
stuck at zero) minus expected inflation, a higher expected inflation rate lowers the real
interest rate. However, that is easier said than done as inflation expectations appear to be
determined by expectations of real economic conditions rather than pronouncements by
the monetary authority.
Solution number two is for the monetary authority to set a negative nominal
interest rate. In principle, it can do this directly by setting its own lending rate below
zero, or alternatively it can adopt non-standard tools such as charging commercial banks
for their deposits with the central bank. Either way, according to the reasoning embodied
in ZLB economics that should solve the problem of demand shortage.
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Ironically, though mainstream economists have not yet connected the dots of their own thinking, this line
of thinking stands to rehabilitate Milton Friedman’s monetarist claim that it central banks which are
responsible for business cycles and unemployment. For Friedman, central banks did this through variation
of the money supply. In ZLB economics, unemployment will result any time the central bank sets too high
an interest rate target.
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3. New Keynesians have forgotten Keynes’ message that interest rates may not solve
demand shortage
The ZLB hypothesis has now become received wisdom regarding stagnation, and it has
significantly informed policy discussion over negative interest rates. ZLB economics is a
mix of classical and neo-Keynesian (sometimes called bastard Keynesian) economics.
The classical dimension concerns its thinking about interest rates and their role in the
economy. The neo-Keynesian dimension is the belief that a rigidity (i.e. the ZLB)
prevents market economies from automatically self-adjusting to full employment. Both
aspects of ZLB economics are wrong.
Keynes’ (1936) General Theory fundamentally challenged classical
macroeconomics and its theory of interest rates. The challenge was directed at both the
theory of interest rate determination and the theory of interest rate effectiveness.
First, Keynes challenged the classical claim that interest rates are determined by
the supply (saving) and demand (investment) for loanable funds, thereby equilibrating
goods market AD and AS. According to Keynesian economics, the loanable funds market
is a fiction that does not exist, so interest rates cannot be determined in this way. Instead,
Keynes proposed that interest rates were determined according to his liquidity preference
theory. Asset prices and interest rates adjust to ensure asset demands (including the
demand for money) equal asset supplies.
Second, Keynes argued that AD and AS are primarily equalized via output
adjustment, rather than interest rate adjustment. That is Keynes famous theory of
demand-determined output. If AD exceeds AS, output expands until AD and AS are
equal: if AD is less than AS, output contracts until AS and AD are equal. According to
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Keynesian economics, it is the level output (i.e. income) that adjusts to equilibrate the
goods market, not the interest rate. Of course, interest rates may be affected as output
adjusts owing to the impact of changing income on portfolio demands for financial assets,
but that interest rate impact is a secondary induced income effect. The Keynesian
construction of the economy is therefore completely different from the classical
construction.
Third, for Keynesians, it is possible that saving and investment may not respond
to lower interest rates as assumed by classical macroeconomics and modern-day ZLB
economics. In effect, the Keynesian concern is with “interest rate sensitivity of AD”,
which is fundamentally different from the ZLB concern with “nominal interest rate
rigidity”. Most importantly, the Keynesian “sensitivity” argument potentially demolishes
the classical NRI doctrine since there may not exist an interest rate that can deliver full
employment.
4. Interest rate ineffectiveness: the NRI, the ZLB and NIRP reconsidered
The issue of interest rate ineffectiveness is critical to assessing the ZLB explanation of
stagnation and the debate over NIRP. Figure 2 depicts the competing theoretical positions
regarding interest rate ineffectiveness. The debate is divided between arguments that
identify nominal interest rate rigidity as the problem versus arguments that identify the
interest rate insensitivity of AD as the problem.
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Figure 2. The debate over the macroeconomic ineffectiveness of interest rates.
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The neo-Keynesians made arguments on both sides of the debate but, as argued
below, their arguments regarding the interest rate insensitivity were not adequate. With
regard to nominal interest rate rigidity, the neo-Keynesians emphasized the liquidity trap
(Keynes, 1936, p.207), captured by the notion of a horizontal LM schedule in Hicks’
(1937) ISLM exposition of The General Theory. In the liquidity trap, the interest rate has
fallen to a level such that it can fall no further because “everyone prefers cash to holding
a debt which yields so low a rate of interest (Keynes, 1936, p.207)”. However, Keynes’
dismissed the liquidity trap as an esoteric irrelevancy. Instead, he argued for the potential
importance of interest rate floors owing to costs of financial intermediation and default
risk which require lenders to charge a rate “over and above the pure rate of interest
(Keynes, 1936, p.208).”
ZLB economics is also a nominal interest rate rigidity argument, and it blends
with the arguments of both Keynes and the neo-Keynesians. First, rather than identifying
11

intermediation costs as the source of the interest rate floor, ZLB economics attributes the
floor to the pure rate of interest and the existence of money which pays zero interest.
Second, ZLB economics misleadingly calls this floor a liquidity trap (Palley,
2000). Doing so gives ZLB economics a rhetorical edge that helps it masquerade as being
Keynesian in spirit. However, the ZLB is not the same as the liquidity trap. In the
liquidity trap expansionary open market operations cannot affect asset prices and interest
rates, making QE is ineffective. However, QE has been shown to have effects at the ZLB
on asset prices, proving the ZLB is not synonymous with the liquidity trap.
Third, ZLB economics connects with neo-Keynesian economics by asserting the
macroeconomic problem is a “rigidity” that blocks lower nominal interest rates. Thus, the
ZLB serves as a new nominal rigidity for explaining unemployment, supplementing
existing neo-Keynesian explanations built on price and nominal wage rigidity.
The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows interest insensitivity of AD as the other
side of the debate. If AD is interest insensitive, lowering the nominal interest rate has no
impact on employment and output, rendering the issue of nominal interest rate rigidity
irrelevant for explaining unemployment. Furthermore, there may be no interest rate
capable of delivering full employment (i.e. no NRI).
Neo-Keynesians captured this possibility via a vertical IS schedule, which was
justified by the claim of zero interest elasticity of investment demand. They argued full
employment could be blocked off because either the LM was horizontal due to the
liquidity trap, or because the IS was vertical due to the interest insensitivity of investment
demand. The neo-Keynesians therefore invoked both interest rate rigidity and interest rate
ineffectiveness. However, and important and faulty feature of their thinking was to
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separate investment demand (interest rate insensitivity of the vertical IS) and money
demand (interest rate rigidity of the horizontal LM). In contrast, as argued next, Keynes
(1936) had a unified theory in which investment demand and money demand interacted
and were two sides of a common argument. That unified argument can be labelled the
“investment saturation hypothesis”.
5. A new interpretation of Keynes’ thinking about interest rate ineffectiveness
Neo-Keynesians argued lower interest rates would not solve the AD shortage problem if
investment was interest insensitive. However, the microeconomics of that argument were
never properly worked out. Instead, the issue was finessed by claims that investment
demand was exclusively dependent on entrepreneurs’ animal spirits and the level of
output (or capacity utilization), and animal spirits are unresponsive to interest rates.
An unfortunate implication of the neo-Keynesian framing of the investment
shortage problem was it squeezed money out of the picture, making it look as if the
investment function was the source of the problem and money had nothing to do with it.8
That neo-Keynesian characterization of the investment function failed to capture Keynes’
(1936) rich approach to capital accumulation which saw investment (i.e. real capital
accumulation) as competing for a place in wealth portfolios, with marginal allocations
depending on marginal returns.
Keynes’ view of accumulation is developed in Chapter 17 (GT, p.225-229) and it
puts non-reproduced assets (NRAs), which include money, at the center of capital
accumulation decision. NRAs consist of money, real estate, precious metals and precious
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The concern with the interest insensitivity of investment may also have contributed to Post Keynesian
macroeconomics going down the wormhole of capital theory, the production function, and the demand for
capital in search of a microeconomic rationale.
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minerals, works of art, patents and copyrights, rent streams generated by firms with
market power. New capital (i.e. investment) must compete with NRAs for a place in
portfolios. That competition links investment demand, money demand, and demand for
NRAs.
The possibility that investment could be displaced by NRAs with higher returns
was identified by Keynes (1936, p. 225 – 236) in a cryptic section on commodity rates of
interest in Chapter 17 of The General Theory:
“Our conclusion can be stated in the most general form (taking the propensity
to consume as given) as follows. No further increase in the rate of investment
is possible when the greatest among the own-rates of own-interest of all
available assets is equal to the greatest amongst the marginal efficiencies of all
assets, measured in terms of the asset whose own-rate of own-interest is
greatest.
In a position of full employment this condition is necessarily satisfied. But
it may be satisfied before full employment is reached, if there exists some
asset, having zero (or relatively small) elasticities of production and
substitution, whose rate of interest declines more slowly as output increases,
than the marginal efficiencies of capital-assets measured in terms of it (Keynes,
1936, p.236).”
One reason why Keynes’ portfolio analysis of investment may have gotten overlooked by post-war Keynesians is that it was developed rather obscurely in Chapter 17. A
second reason is Keynes’ use of the term “entrepreneur”, which conflates the firm and the
individual agent. Instead, it is best to talk about the firm as the locus of investment
activity. Firms can be considered as real sector multi-input multi-output financial
intermediaries. They take finance from different sources and use that finance to hold
different types of assets that produce different returns, and this multi-input multi-output
choice has analogies with portfolio decision making.
When framed in this way, it explains why negative nominal interest rates may not
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alleviate the problem of aggregate demand shortage. The reason is once the marginal
efficiency of investment (MEI) hits zero, firms will prefer to use additional finance to
acquire NRAs whose marginal return is still positive. Consequently, the ZLB floor is not
the problem. Instead the problem is the existence of NRAs, including money.
Money is a distinct type of NRA. The existence of money explains the existence
of the ZLB, but the deeper problem for investment is the existence of NRAs with higher
returns than investment. Consequently, even if the central bank were to make the nominal
cost of finance negative (i.e. there were no ZLB), firms will still refuse to invest more
and prefer to acquire NRAS assets instead.
Furthermore, if the return on money is negative, firms will shift toward holding
other NRAs. Thus, even Gessel’s suggestion of taxing money via a negative interest rate
on money does not solve the problem.9
The argument can be illustrated with the following simple partial equilibrium
model of investment and asset allocation.10 On the asset side, firms have an initial capital
stock (K0) which they can increase via new investment (I), and they can also hold money
(M) and NRAs (G). Each asset has its own pattern of diminishing marginal returns. The
marginal return to investment eventually becomes negative owing to the diminishing
marginal efficiency of investment (MEI).11 The marginal return to non-produced stores
of value is diminishing but always strictly positive. Money has a diminishing positive
own return (i.e. liquidity services) plus interest. The interest rate on money is the central
Gessel’s thinking is discussed extensively by Keynes in the General Theory (1936, p.353-58).
The model is drawn from Palley (2016b).
11
For neo-Keynesians, the investment function (MEI) is derived from the neoclassical production function.
The MEI is declining (i.e. downward sloping) because of diminishing returns to adding capital, and because
of rising adjustment costs to adding capital. Keynesians have a different explanation of the investment
function, whereby it is downward sloping because of the diminishing profitability of the marginal
investment project.
9
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banks money market rate minus a fixed intermediation cost (a fixed charge per dollar
deposited). If the interest rate on money is negative, the marginal total return on money
can turn negative. On the liabilities side, firms are financed by a mix of equity (E) and
loans (L) and there is a positively sloped supply of each type of finance. The loan rate is a
mark-up over the money market interest rate plus a default premium that increases with
lending owing to declining credit worthiness of marginal borrowers.
Rates of return and costs of finance are given by:
(1) rI = R(K0) – κ(I) – δ + π

R’ < 0, κ’ < 0

(2) rM = iM + φ(M)

φ’ < 0

(3) rG = ψ(G) + π

ψ’ < 0

(4) rE = ξ(E) + π

ξ’ > 0

(5) rL = iL + ρ + λ(L)

λ’ > 0

(6) iL = iF
(7) iM = [1 – k]iF + c
rI = rate of return on investment (marginal efficiency of investment), R(K0) = marginal
product of the existing capital stock (K0), κ(I) = marginal adjustment costs of adding new
capital via investment, δ = depreciation rate, π = inflation, rM = total return on money, iM
= deposit interest rate, φ(M) = marginal own return on money from its liquidity services,
rG = total return on non-produced assets, ψ(G) = rate of return on non-produced assets, rE
= nominal rate of interest on equity finance, ξ(E) = real cost of equity finance, iL =
wholesale cost of finance (i.e. money market interest rate), ρ = commercial banks’ loan
mark-up per dollar of loans, λ(L) = default rate per dollar of loans, iF = central bank
policy interest rate, k = reserve requirements per dollar of deposits, c = commercial
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banks’ administrative cost per dollar of deposits. Figure 3 shows the pattern of rates of
return on different assets and the supply function for different types of finance.12

Figure 3. Nominal rates of asset returns and costs of finance
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In equilibrium, firms equalize the marginal costs of sources of funds with
marginal benefits from application of funds so that rates of return and cost are equalized.
This implies the condition rI = rM = rG = rE = rL. The solution is illustrated in Figure 4.
The total demand for assets is obtained by summing the different asset demands. All
variables are in real terms, deflated by the general price level. The total supply of finance
is obtained by horizontally summing the different sources of supply.13 The intersection of
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The return on non-produced assets is adjusted stream of income from non-produced assets (RG) divided
by the nominal value of the stock of non-produced assets (G) plus inflation. The nominal value of the stock
is G = pGG where pG = nominal price of non-produced assets and G = stock of non-produced assets. This
implies ψ(G) = RG/G and ψ’ < 0.
13

The supply of money is endogenous and determined by the volume of bank lending. The banking
system’s consolidated balance sheet constraint is given by Loans + Reserves = Deposits (L + kM = M).
That implies M = L/[1 – k].
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demand and supply determines the equilibrium return on assets and cost of finance. The
mix of asset holdings and sources of finance is then determined by the individual demand
and supply functions at the equilibrium rate of return.
Figure 4. Equilibrium financing, investment and asset holdings of firms in normal times (i F > 0).
rI = rM = rG = rE = rL
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Monetary policy works by lowering the money market risk free interest rate. That
shifts down the loan supply function and also lowers the return on money holdings (via a
lower deposit rate). Total supply and demand shift down by an equal amount, which
leaves the total size of the firms´balance sheet unchanged. However, there is a change in
the composition of the firm´s balance sheet. First, firms switch from equity finance to
loan finance because loan finance is cheaper. A lower policy interest rate induces firms to
return equity to shareholders and adopt a more risky balance sheet financing structure.
Second, firms reduce money holdings and increase investment (capital accumulation) and
holdings of NRAs.
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Now, suppose the monetary authority sets a negative interest rate by targeting a
negative money market rate. The loan supply shifts down and its initial portion becomes
negative. Money demand also shifts down and its end portion becomes negative. With
regard to financing of firms, if the money market interest rate is sufficiently negative so
that the loan rate is sufficiently low, firms may switch completely to loan finance. They
do this via debt-financed share buybacks and special dividends that return all equity to
shareholders.
With regard to asset holdings, even though the deposit interest rate is negative,
firms still hold some money because the “own liquidity return” on money is positive and
increases as the firm´s money holdings fall. Once the MEI falls to zero, no firm will
invest more because they can do better acquiring NRAs. Given the marginal return to
NRAs is always greater than or equal to zero, there comes a point when all extra loan
finance from negative loan rates will be directed to increasing holdings of NRAs rather
than investment.
In sum, the ZLB is not the problem. The problem is the existence of NRAs such
as money, real estate, precious metals, commodities, assets like patents and copyrights,
rents streams derived from monopoly power, and assets like technical knowhow and
organizational capital embodied in existing firms. Negative interest rates will contribute
to bidding up the price of those assets but will not increase investment.
6. Other structural factors limiting investment
The above analysis is in the spirit of Keynes’ General Theory. It shows why negative
interest rates will not increase investment. Instead, firms will increase leverage, buy-back
equity, and bid up the price of non-produced assets via take-overs.
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Additionally, there are other structural factors that limit investment spending.
First, production function theory is critical. In neoclassical theory additional capital can
always be put to use because of perfectly smooth substitutability between capital and
labor, which means it is impossible to have excess capital. However, if production is
characterized by Leontieff conditions or capital is putty-clay in nature, it is possible to
have excess capital in times of demand shortage, which will further constrain the
sensitivity of investment to negative interest rates.
Second, capital is long-lived and lumpy. In a multi-period model, the willingness
to use low interest rate loans to finance investment today depends on expectations of
future interest rates. Even if today´s loan rates are negative, firms may be unwilling to
borrow to finance relatively low yielding investment today if they think those investment
projects will be saddled with future high loan interest costs.
Third, in neoclassical capital theory the MEI schedule is determined by
technological conditions. Keynes had in mind a different construct in which the MEI
depended on the state of animal spirits and perceptions of the fundamentally uncertain
future. In this case the MEI may shift toward the origin in bad times, making it even more
difficult to increase investment.
7. Can negative interest rates reduce saving?
The other side of the Keynesian AD shortage problem is saving. That raises the question
if negative interest rates cannot increase investment, can they increase AD by reducing
saving? Here too, the answer is probably not.
First, in pure consumption theory a lower real interest rate gives rise to both
positive inter-temporal substitution and negative income effects. Consequently, the
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theoretical effect of lower real interest rates on consumption is ambiguous. The conflict
between substitution and income effects is easily understood. Negative interest rates
provide an incentive to save less and consume now. Balanced against that, negative
interest rates lower future income and total lifetime income, which gives an incentive to
increase saving to compensate for that loss. For instance, consider the case of a household
which lives for two periods, has a zero discount rate, income of y in period 1 and zero
income in period 2. The real interest rate is r. The optimal consumption plan has equal
consumption per period so that C1 = C2 = y[1 + r]/[2 + r] and period 1 saving is S1 = y/[2
+ r]. A lower interest rate lowers period 1 consumption (dC1/dr > 0) and increases period
1 saving (dS1/dr > 0).
Second, a negative nominal interest rate on money holdings (i.e. deposits) can be
thought of as a form of tax on deposits. That lowers real wealth and will generate a
negative “Pigou effect” on consumption spending and AD. Balanced against this, there
will be a positive wealth effect on AD owing to the portfolio shift away from money to
NRAs that increases the price of those assets.
Theoretically, the net impact of negative nominal interest rates on saving and AD
is therefore ambiguous. Negative interest rates could reduce saving, but they could also
increase saving. The saving function could be a positive function of interest rates (Sr > 0),
but it could also be a negative function of interest rates (Sr < 0).
8. Non-existence of the NRI: the implications of interest rate ineffectiveness
The above theoretical excavation of investment and saving has profound implications that
can be readily understood via a Keynesian investment – saving (IS) model of the goods
market. Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the ZLB and investment
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saturation hypotheses.14 Figure 5.a shows a standard IS schedule which is confronted by
a ZLB interest rate floor. If monetary policy could lower the interest rate below zero, AD
and output would increase. The economy would slide down the IS via a combination of
increased investment and reduced saving.

Figures 5.a, 5.b, and 5.c. The ZLB versus investment saturation hypothesis.
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Figure 5.a. The ZLB hypothesis.
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Figure 5.b. Vertical IS hypothesis.
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Figure 5.c. Backward bending IS hypothesis.

Figure 5.b shows the case where the IS schedule becomes vertical as the nominal
interest rate approaches zero and then turns negative. In that case both investment and
saving become unresponsive to further reductions in the nominal interest rate. There are
two important implications. First, the impact of monetary policy, conducted via lower
interest rates, will steadily diminish and eventually become zero. Second, there may be
no interest rate that can ensure sufficient AD to deliver full employment. In technical

14

The figures are drawn under the simplifying assumption that the inflation rate is zero so that the nominal
and real interest rates are identical. If the inflation rate is non-zero and positive there is need to add a
shadow nominal IS schedule that lies above the IS schedule, with the gap between the two schedules equal
to the inflation rate. The ZLB becomes binding when the shadow IS intersects the ZLB.
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terms, there is no “natural” rate of interest that equilibrates full employment AD and AS.
Lastly, Figure 5.c shows the case where the IS schedule is backward bending and
becomes positively sloped once the nominal interest rate drops below zero. In this case,
the response of saving to the interest rate becomes negative (i.e. Sr < 0), making the
situation even more problematic. Now, in the region where the IS schedule is positively
sloped, lowering interest rates below zero actually worsens the shortage of demand and
lowers output and employment. Consequently, pursuit of NIRP will be counterproductive and will lower employment and output.
Figure 5 makes clear the analytical difference between ZLB economics and the
investment saturation hypothesis. ZLB economics focuses on interest rate rigidities. The
investment saturation hypothesis rests on a pathological IS schedule rooted in the
behavior of investment and saving. The two arguments are easy to conflate as money
plays a role in both. ZLB economics argues money is the cause of the ZLB. The
investment saturation hypothesis emphasizes the role of NRAs, one of which is money,
that make investment insensitive to negative interest rates.
9. Negative financial sector effects of NIRP
The above analysis shows how the ZLB may not be the cause of Keynesian
unemployment and how NIRP may have negative AD effects. Worse yet, NIRP may have
additional adverse financial sector effects that include credit disruption in the banking
sector, promotion of generalized financial instability, and promotion of macroeconomic
policy whiplash effects.15
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It should be made absolutely clear that this disruption has nothing to do with reduced saving. Within a
modern economy, money is endogenous and created by the act of bank lending. Credit disruption can occur
because negative interest rates may change the behavior banks. Unfortunately, in classical loanable funds
theory, negative interest rates may also disrupt credit by lowering saving, thereby lowering peer-to-peer
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(a) Disruption of bank credit
Negative interest rates can disrupt the provision of bank credit and also raise the cost of
credit. Bank interest rates are determined as follows
(8) iL = iF
(9) rL = iL + ρ + λ(L)

λ’ > 0

(10) iM = [1 – k]iF – c
iL = inter-bank loan rate, iF = central bank’s money market target interest rate, rL = bank
loan rate, ρ = loan mark-up, λ(L) = administration and default costs per dollar lent, iM =
deposit interest rate, k = bank reserves held per dollar of deposits, c = administration cost
per dollar.
Banks are mark-up pricers. Equation (1) has the wholesale cost of finance for
banks equal to the central bank’s money market target interest rate. Equation (2) sets the
loan rate as a mark-up over the wholesale cost of bank finance. The mark-up includes a
profit margin plus all loan administration and default costs. Equation (3) sets the deposit
rate. Deposits are perfect substitutes with wholesale finance, so banks pay an interest rate
on deposits that is adjusted for the costs of reserve holdings and deposit administration. If
k = c = 0, the deposit rate is the same as the money market rate.
At this stage, it is necessary to discuss how negative rates are implemented.
Option 1 is the central bank lowers its lending rate to commercial banks below zero.
Option 2 is the central bank charges commercial banks with interest on their deposits of
liquid reserves with the central bank. In practice, central banks have favored option 2
over option 1.

lending of output (“corn”). It is this type of capacity to generate apparently similar outcomes that keeps the
loanable funds model of credit alive despite its underlying microeconomic incoherence.
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Option 1. If the central bank charges a negative lending rate, this implies iL = iF
< 0. The deposit rate is strictly negative, and the loan rate can be negative if the central
bank sets its lending rate sufficiently negative. As argued earlier, wealth holders will have
an incentive to reduce money holdings and shift into other assets. Lower rates of return
may then increase or decrease saving. As regards firms, they will not increase investment
if the marginal efficiency of investment is negative. Instead, they will use credit to pay
back equity (i.e. stock buybacks) and acquire non-produced assets (i.e. take-overs).
An important point about a negative central bank loan rate is that it is an implicit
fiscal transfer, conducted via the central bank. Effectively, the central bank is subsidizing
borrowing. Since existing borrowers will look to refinance existing loans, the central
bank will likely end up refinancing much of the debt stock. Those who can borrow will
also do so to buy non-produced assets that still have positive expected return, so debt
would increase sharply and so would prices of non-produced assets. Viewed in this light,
a negative central bank loan rate is a form of helicopter money that drops money on the
debtor segment of the economy. Via the intermediation activities of banks, it also impacts
rates of return on assets. The fact that it is an implicit fiscal transfer, combined with the
incentive it gives to increase the debt stock, may explain why central banks have shied
away from setting a negative target interest rate.
Option 2 involves the central bank charging commercial banks interest on
reserves. This is a subtly different way of lowering interest rates. It works asymetrically
by lowering the deposit rate but leaving the wholesale finance rate unchanged at iL = iF.
The new deposit rate is given by
(4) iM = [1 – k]iF – c – kp
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p = the interest penalty on deposits with the central bank. Since commercial banks
deposit k of each dollar of customer deposits, the interest penalty that is passed on to
depositors is kp. Charging a penalty on reserves imposes a cost on banks, and that cost is
passed along to depositors.
On the positive side, a lower deposit rate induces a portfolio shift into other
financial assets. That drives up asset prices and generates a wealth effect that stimulates
consumption. On the negative side, lower rates on deposits are akin to a tax on that
lowers interest income, which may decrease consumption spending and increase saving.
In addition to these simple effects, there are also more complex possible effects.
Suppose depositors are valued by individual banks because they are a cheap and stable
source of bank finance and deposits are acquired by building customer relationships. In
that case, banks may refrain from passing on the cost to depositors for fear of losing
depositors to other banks that are competing for depositors. In that event, the central
bank’s deposit charge will be shifted.
One possibility is that banks bear the cost, which will lower bank profits. That
could cause banks to engage in credit rationing or withdraw from providing credit to
particular markets and customers which are more risky and only marginally profitable.
That would adversely impact AD.
A second possibility is that banks would pass the cost on to borrowers via higher
loan rates. In that case, the central banks attempt to generate negative interest rates to
stimulate the economy would backfire in the form of higher loan rates that discourage
borrowing and reduce AD. Asset prices could also fall if higher loan rates cause
deleveraging of debt financed asset purchases. This would be good for reducing debt, but
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would be bad for AD and economic activity which is the motivation behind NIRP.
(b) Financial fragility and instability
A second financial problem from negative interest rates concerns financial fragility and
financial instability, and there are many dimensions to this issue. In general, many of
these concerns can also apply to lower interest rates, but they are amplified in an
environment of negative interest rates.
With regard to the specifics of financial fragility and instability, the earlier
analysis of investment showed that NIRP will promote risky balance sheet re-engineering
by firms. Availability of negative interest rate credit will not induce additional
investment. Instead, firms will use that credit to repurchase equity (i.e. shift toward debt
financing) and to purchase non-produced assets (i.e. engage in speculative merger &
acquisition activity). These are exactly the features we have seen, and the result is to
leverage up corporate balance sheets. That leveraging of balance sheets creates financial
fragility as increased debt makes firms vulnerable to future unexpected adverse
developments. It also poses a threat to future economic activity by limiting firms’
capacity to undertake future investments.
A second problem is that negative interest rates encourage asset price bubbles and
fragile balance sheets. With regard to firms, there is an incentive to engage in creditfinanced mergers and acquisitions. With regard to households, there is an incentive to
reduce portfolio holdings of money and bonds, and to increase holdings of risky assets
and alternative stores of value in a chase a chase for yield and capital gains.
(c) Financial disintermediation and disruption
Another set of problems concerns financial disintermediation and disruption. Negative
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interest rates induce economic agents to reduce money holdings and look for other stores
of value and media of exchange. As regards stores of value, this may show in the form of
precious metals inflation, commodity price inflation and land inflation as agents look for
other ways to hold wealth. As regards media of exchange, it may show in increased use of
cash and credit cards, the introduction of new monies such as bit-coin, and devotion of
more resources to minimize money holdings subject to holding charges.
These developments constitute a form of inefficiency that reduces potential
economic output. Money reduces transactions costs. Imposing a penalty on money raises
transaction costs, which can both discourage productive transactions and reduce the gain
from those transactions that are undertaken. This constitutes an adverse “supply-side”
effect of negative interest rates. Furthermore, particularly as regards use of cash, there
may be adverse fiscal implications in the form of tax evasion and increased size of the
underground economy.
Additionally, ultra-low and negative interest rates can cause financial disruption
by jeopardizing the business models related to insurance and retirement income
provision, which are large and important financial sub-sectors. Insurance companies rely
on premium and interest income to meet claims, while pension funds rely on investment
income to meet future pension payments. Both insurance companies and pension funds
are threatened by ultra-low and negative interest rates which lower their income.
In response, insurance companies may raise premiums, which is the equivalent of
a small tax that lowers aggregate demand. Both insurance companies and pension funds
will also likely shift the composition of their portfolios toward risky assets, in a search for
yield. That shift will add to asset price bubble pressures, and it also makes their balance
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sheets more fragile and vulnerable in the event of future asset price reversals. This
vulnerability has no immediate impact today, but it is a channel for future economic
disruption. That illustrates how use of monetary policy today can impose significant costs
tomorrow.
(d) Whiplash effects of NIRP
The potential future costs of financial fragility and asset price bubbles raise the prospect
of policy whiplash effects. The core problem is the contradiction between current and
future policy actions.
The economy currently suffers from shortage of AD owing to systemic failings
related to income inequality and trade deficit leakages (Palley, 2009, 2012). That demand
shortage was papered over by a thirty year credit bubble plus successive asset price
bubbles, which eventually burst with the financial crisis of 2008. Now, central banks are
seeking to revive AD via negative interest rates that will reflate the credit and asset price
bubbles.
That process creates a contradiction. If the policy is successful, it will necessitate
raising interest rates in future. That risks triggering another financial crisis as the new
bubbles burst and the effects of accumulated financial fragility magnify the ensuing
fallout. When asset prices are inflated, subsequent very small upward moves in the
interest rate can produce large capital losses. In effect, policy measures to revive the
economy now via NIRP can generate even greater imbalances that produce whiplash
effects later.
This whiplash process has been building for thirty years. Disinflation allowed
successive lowering of interest rates from the double digit levels of 1980, thereby
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producing successively larger boom – bust cycles. That process appeared to be ended by
the financial crisis of 2008 which pushed the economy to the ZLB. However, central
banks have sought to circumvent the ZLB circuit-breaker via NIRP. If NIRP is pursued
for an extended period of time, without remedying the deep causes of AD shortage, the
prospect is a future more intractable economic crisis.
Each fresh crisis is harder to escape because the economy enters it with greater
debt burdens and more fragile balance sheets. The history of successive crises may also
induce a form of financial post-traumatic stress syndrome whereby businesses and
households are psychologically scarred and fearful. That generates risk aversion which
lowers investment and increases saving, thereby aggravating the systemic shortage of
AD.
(e). Competitive devaluation and NIRP
In addition to these adverse domestic economic effects, NIRP also has adverse
international economic effects. Those adverse effects concern the process of competitive
devaluation, which Brazil’s former finance minister Guido Mantega, referred to as
“currency wars” in 2010.
The problem of competitive devaluation was identified in the Great Depression of
the 1930s and it produces “beggar-thy-neighbor” international economic relations. In an
economic environment of demand shortage, countries have an incentive to depreciate
their currencies. That makes their exports cheaper and imports more expensive, which
together increases demand for domestically produced goods and services. The trouble is
the demand comes at the expense of demand for other countries’ products: hence, the
beggar-thy-neighbor label.
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This problem was pervasive in the 1930s and has re-emerged with NIRP, which
generates competitive devaluation on steroids. That is because negative interest rates give
private investors an incentive to exit a country’s money and exchange it for another’s to
earn higher rates elsewhere. Moreover, increased financial capital mobility and capital
account openness have strengthened that incentive. This is exemplified by Japan, where
negative interest rates have sparked a carry-trade that involves borrowing yen and then
converting into dollars to buy higher yielding dollar denominated securities.
Competitive devaluation does not just shift demand between countries, it may also
reduce total global demand. That makes it a negative sum game with a prisoner’s
dilemma structure. The reason competitive devaluation lowers global demand (i.e. is
negative sum) is it creates financial uncertainty, which undermines firms’ incentives to
invest. Firms will refrain from making costly investments if they think exchange rate
movements may undermine the competitiveness and profitability of those investments.
The reason it is a prisoner’s dilemma is each country knows it will win big if it
devalues and others do not. Therefore, each country has an incentive to devalue, but when
they all devalue the result is global demand is reduced and all lose. This pattern is
illustrated in Table 1 which shows the payoffs to a competitive devaluation game played
between countries A and B. They would both be better-off if neither devalued (payoff = 0,
0). But each is better-off if it alone devalues (10 vs. -10). The result is both devalue
resulting in the negative sum outcome (payoff = -5, -5).
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Table 1. Competitive devaluation as a negative sum game between countries
(payoff to A, payoff to B).

Country A

Country B

Devalue

Do not
devalue

Devalue

(-5, -5)

(-10, 10)

Do not
devalue

(10, -10)

(0, 0)

NIRP encourages competitive devaluation dynamics by encouraging carry-trade
currency speculation and international chase for yield by investors. Additionally,
globalization has increased policymakers’ incentive to engage in strategic competitive
devaluation. That is because globalization has encouraged an offshore manufacturing
model in which corporations from developed countries either build export production
platforms in developing countries or outsource manufacturing to those countries.
Developing countries then sell that production in developed country markets. This has
encouraged the phenomenon of export-led growth whereby developing economies grow
by exports rather than by developing their own domestic markets.
Exchange rates are key to the export-led model, which intensifies the tendency
toward competitive devaluation dynamics. The reason is the export-led growth model
promotes intense competition between developing countries both for export markets and
for new foreign investment. That intensifies the incentive for developing countries to
engage in competitive devaluation, and NIRP worsens that proclivity.
9. Political economy and future stagnation dangers of NIRP
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A final set of problems with NIRP concern its political economy impacts. Like QE, NIRP
aims to increase the price of financial assets – particularly risky assets like equities which
become more attractive as interest rates fall. Since such risky assets are predominantly
held by wealthier households, that further increases the relative wealth of those
households at a time of heightened income and wealth inequality.
That may have significant adverse impacts on politics and policy. First, given the
powerful role of money in politics, increasing the wealth of the wealthy enables them to
further influence politics. Second, to the extent that the wealthy are satisfied with the
impacts of NIRP, that diminishes the pressure for additional policies to strengthen the
economy. As documented by political scientists Gilens and Page (2014), the affluent
significantly get the policies they want. NIRP therefore does double damage: it has a
plutocratic bias and it also removes the pressure for other more substantial policies.
NIRP also has profound effects on the outlook for retirement and retirement
income. Lower interest rates reduce the capacity to save for retirement, and negative
interest rates have an even worse effect. Ordinary households are more risk averse
because of their lower wealth and inability to bear losses. Thus, asset price gains induced
by policies like QE and NIRP are likely to bypass those households because they cannot
afford to take the risk of holding risky asset classes and suffering potential future losses.
Historically, bank certificates of deposit (CDs) and bonds have provided returns
with appropriate risk for such households, but NIRP takes both off the table. CD yields
can go negative, while bonds become vulnerable to large price losses in the event that
future interest rates are higher. In a NIRP fed environment of asset price bubbles,
ordinary risk averse households are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea - the
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devil of negative interest rates and the deep blue sea of potentially disastrous capital
losses from a burst asset price bubble. Moreover, this is particularly painful at a time
when defined benefit pensions have been significantly eliminated and the risk of
retirement income provision has been shifted on to individual households. This
microeconomic impact is over-looked by monetary policy which tends to focus
exclusively on macroeconomic concerns, and it explains why NIRP has contributed to
fostering bitter political feelings that foster toxic political outcomes.
Younger workers are also vulnerable to NIRP induced asset market distortions.
Those who acquire equities for their retirement portfolios risk large future losses if
interest rates revert to normal levels, which is the express goal of NIRP. Historically,
retirement income has been facilitated by an equity premium. NIRP risks transforming
that into an equity penalty.
The problem is even worse with house prices, which are particularly prone to
NIRP induced bubbles. House purchases are largely financed with mortgages, and lower
interest rates therefore drive up prices by lowering mortgage payments and increasing
cash-flow affordability. However, there are massive downsides stemming from mortgage
debt. The interest payment on a $200,000 home at 6% is the same as the payment on a
$400,000 home at 3%. Yet, purchasers are saddled with a larger mortgage that they must
pay back in the future, and they also lose financial flexibility and are rendered more
financially vulnerable.
As regards flexibility, if house prices subsequently fall back because interest rates
mean revert (i.e. revert to normal), then borrowers will find themselves underwater. That
may prevent them from selling and moving to take up better economic opportunities. As
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regards vulnerability, if the household suffers an economic shock (e.g. a job loss), it may
be unable to pay its mortgage and risks default and the lasting losses that go with that.
The benefits of NIRP induced stock price and house price inflation go to existing
owners. Normal future capital gains are brought forward and transferred to current
owners, while buyers are subjected to significant financial risk. Viewed in that light, asset
price inflation is a form of inter-generational transfer that ladens the future with burdens
and risks, and the transfer of future capital gains removes an important source of future
economic stimulus.
Putting the pieces together, using NIRP to fight stagnation today is likely to be
ineffective and possibly counter-productive for reasons discussed earlier,. At the same
time, NIRP may shift stagnation into the future via asset transactions that burden the
future, and that process can generate future disappointments and resentments that produce
ugly politics.
10. Conclusion: the misguided new consensus of ZLB economics and NIRP
The mainstream economics profession has now settled on the ZLB as the theoretical
explanation for the stagnation that followed the Great Recession of 2008-09. On the back
of that new theoretical consensus, NIRP has quickly become a consensus policy within
the economics establishment.
This paper has argued that this new policy consensus is dangerously wrong,
resting on flawed theory and flawed policy assessment. Regarding theory, NIRP draws on
fallacious pre-Keynesian classical economic logic that asserts real interest rate adjustment
can ensure full employment. Regarding policy assessment, NIRP turns a blind eye to the
possibility that negative interest rates may reduce AD, cause financial fragility, create a
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macroeconomics of whiplash owing to contradictions between policy today and
tomorrow, promote currency wars that undermine the international economy, and foster a
political economy that spawns toxic politics. Worst of all, NIRP maintains and
encourages the flawed model of growth, based on debt and asset price inflation, which
has already done such harm.
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